Seven months into the war between the US, Israel, and Iran, decision-makers in Tehran appear in no rush to end it despite the country's economy and infrastructure facing significant strain. Iran may want to demonstrate that the US cannot dictate the pace of the conflict, and also hopes to increase the military, economic, and political costs borne by the United States, ultimately pushing Washington to accept some of Iran's demands.
Yet much depends on the answer to a crucial question: how long can Iran actually sustain this war? Parts of Iran's defence industry and rocket production facilities have been targeted, but there are no independent figures determining the extent of the damage. In its latest assessment, the Chatham House research institute said there are no reliable estimates for Iran's current rocket reserves.
The pace of Iran's ballistic rocket launches has slowed over time. However, the ability to continue the war is not measured only by the number of rockets: drones and cruise missiles are easier and faster to produce, killed leaders have so far been replaced, and command and control structures remain intact. Muhammad Qaeedi, a lecturer in international relations at George Washington University, told BBC News Farsi that "Iran may be able to sustain its capability to conduct launch operations for a long time, albeit at a lower pace, and still be able to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz."
Iranian decision-makers also believe a prolonged conflict can harm the US. Intercepting Iranian rockets and drones has depleted some of America's defence reserves, and some US assessments have warned that replacing them will not be quick. Qaeedi also said that "the war's impact on oil prices and domestic political considerations in the US have created expectations in Tehran that they can force Washington to accept some of their conditions." At home, support for President Donald Trump among Republican voters remains relatively strong, but public opinion polls continue to show American public dissatisfaction with the conflict and concern that Trump is not achieving his war objectives.
If Tehran's calculations are correct, its goal need not be to militarily defeat the US: a longer and costlier war could itself be a tool of pressure. So far, there are no signs that military constraints alone will force Iran to end the war. Before the war began, Iran's economy already faced high inflation, insufficient investment, currency depreciation, and widespread structural imbalances. According to World Bank estimates, Iran's economy shrank by around 2.7 per cent during the 2025-2026 fiscal year, with the war only beginning in the final weeks of that period.
The war has imposed new pressures. Figures from Iran's statistics centre show that the annual inflation rate over 12 months reached 62 per cent. The heaviest pressure is in the southern provinces most affected by the war: for example, inflation exceeded 101 per cent in Hormozgan province. In the labour market, the war has caused the loss of more than one million jobs and left approximately two million people unemployed directly or indirectly, according to Iran's deputy labour minister.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that Iran's economy will contract by around 5.4 per cent in 2026, and inflation will approach 69 per cent. The duration of the war and the extent of disruption to trade and oil exports will have a very significant impact. The Strait of Hormuz functions as a tool of pressure and a point of weakness simultaneously; disrupting traffic through this channel can increase the cost of war for the US and the global energy market, but American naval blockades and shipping restrictions also make it difficult for Iran to export oil.
However, economic pressure does not necessarily lead to change. Qaeedi said that autocratic governments can endure for years even in extremely difficult economic conditions. Inflation, unemployment, and structural imbalances can increase discontent, but will not change Tehran's military policy unless accompanied by widespread protests or internal government divisions.
There is no consensus in Tehran on the best path forward. Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf, speaker of parliament and head of Iran's negotiating delegation, has previously warned that Iran should not fall into the trap of an "attrition war", and has criticised negotiating counterparts. However, Amir Hossein Thabti, a hardline deputy from Tehran in parliament, said that even if the US accepted all of Iran's conditions and signed an agreement, the war would still occur. This disagreement cannot be reduced to two camps of "pro-war" and "pro-peace"; Qalibaf also stressed that he would not accept an agreement that did not guarantee Iran's rights. The disagreement is more centred on how long sustained pressure can create additional bargaining chips for Tehran, and at what point the cost of this pressure begins to exceed its benefits.
What does public opinion think? There are no independent and reliable public opinion surveys on its position regarding the continuation of the war, and social media does not represent all of society. However, Hamid Reza Azizi, an Iran expert and visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, indicated in an interview with the BBC that "the most dangerous frontline" for the Islamic Republic may ultimately be the domestic frontline. He linked this to severe inflation, economic problems, and pressure on the country's infrastructure.
A prolonged war could also incur regional costs for Iran. In recent years, Tehran has sought to improve its relations with Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Ongoing attacks on bases, infrastructure, and shipping routes in these countries could undermine that. These countries have so far sought to reduce tensions and return to negotiations, but the more they feel threatened by attacks from Iran or allied forces, the greater their motivation to strengthen defence cooperation with the US, and possibly confront Iran.
Any pressure on the US resulting from a prolonged war only has political value for Tehran if they can translate this pressure into concessions at the negotiating table. It remains unclear what form an agreement could take that would give Iran an acceptable end to the war, or how such an agreement could be reached. Azizi said: "What is lacking in Iran's strategy is a clear explanation of how to convert the bargaining chips gained during the war into a sustainable political agreement. Tehran has shown that it is capable of disrupting global energy supplies and imposing costs on the US and its allies. Yet there is uncertainty about how to maintain permanent confrontation with the US."
